The secular state

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Throughout history, religion and state have had - and in some cases still do - deep connections, in which political power and religious power are confused. At the same time, it is undeniable that religion also played a fundamental role in the construction of most modern societies; the Judeo-Christian heritage is one of the foundations of Western civilization. Despite increasing secularization, religious phenomena are still too important today to be simply disregarded. And the experiences of the past and the present should help us to delimit in what terms this delicate relationship must take place.

The philosopher Jürgen Habermas, one of those who recognize the relevant role of religion as a constitutive element of society, defines the laity of the state as "the neutrality of state power, with regard to worldviews, neutrality that guarantees equal ethical liberties to all citizens.” This means that the state should not privilege or curb a particular religion in its public policies - but rather should guarantee freedom of religion and worship, including the public.

''The lay state is not the same as the atheist state ''

The definition of Habermas condemns not only one extreme, which would be the confessional state; it also reminds us that the secular state is not the same as the atheist state. Atheism is still a conviction on religious matters, and a state that defines itself as atheist would therefore be adopting a position that violates the neutrality defined by Habermas. Confusing secular state and atheist state is tantamount to confusing healthy secularism with dangerous secularism - dangerous because it violates individual freedoms and can degenerate into pure and simple religious persecution, as it did in revolutionary France and communist regimes.

This "middle way" also means that the state does not violate its secularity when it cooperates with religious institutions in actions aimed at building the common good, nor when it recognizes the role of religion as a constituent element of a society's culture - a role that manifests itself, for example, on the calendar and display of religious symbols in public places. Let us think, for example, of how ridiculous it would be to order that all places that refer to religious figures be renamed.

Another application of a good middle ground is religious education in the public school system, a delicate subject in which there are several possible exits; the only option that should be strongly rejected is the one in which the state defines the content, transforming the discipline into the presentation of contents that we could call "comparative religion" or "religious culture", approaching the religious phenomenon from a purely historical point of view, sociological or anthropological. Although it is not always perceived, such imposition necessarily presupposes a position of a religious nature: either one admits the highest excellence of one beliefs over the other, by frontally violating secularity, or, in practice, by taking them all at equal value, a vision of a culturalist and relativist court which, obviously but subtly, also violates the neutrality proposed by Habermas.

The "secular state" argument has been used inappropriately for the purpose of transforming religion into a strictly private matter, which only has citizenship space from the doors of the residences inwards. This is to ignore the difference between the size of government and the size of society. Here, it is up to the state to recognize the importance of religion in society, without actions that aim to minimize this phenomenon - which would be an undue interference.

"Whatever religions plead must be justified on purely rational terms"

Another important aspect to understand the laity of the state is the presence of religions in the public sphere, in the discussion of the issues that society considers important for its development. If we consider it quite normal for unions, class organizations, pressure groups, social movements and minorities to present their demands to the public power, and we do so because we see these entities as representatives of organized civil society, why would we deny this right to churches and other denominations, which are also part of this same society? The argument that religions are trying to "impose their convictions on the population as a whole" does not hold. Any lawsuit - not just those presented by churches - brings with it a vision of good, truth or justice that is not necessarily the same as the others. In addition, the final decision-making power over legislation and public policy is always the democratic institutions and the three powers. No union, class entity, social movement or church has the legal capacity to force a President of the Republic, the National Congress or the Federal Supreme Court to act in accordance with their interests.

That said, political philosophy was in charge of analyzing the best ways for religions to participate in public debate. Habermas differentiates between what he calls the "informal public sphere" and the formal public sphere (defined by him as "parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations.”) In that, religions can manifest as they please, even using their own language. But in the formal spheres, John Rawls offers a sure recipe: whatever religions plead must be justified on purely rational terms - that is, understood (and refuted) even by those who do not have the same belief. Habermas reinforces this idea when he states that "every citizen should know and accept that they only account for secular reasons beyond the institutional threshold that separates the informal public sphere from parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations." A religious entity called to defend a particular position to a Legislative audience, or as an amicus curiae in the Judiciary, for example, will inevitably have to resort to rational arguments. "Because the Bible says" or "because God commanded" will never be valid arguments for this criterion; on the other hand, ethical, anthropological, philosophical and even scientific considerations can be quietly invoked, for they may find adequate reception even by those who are of a different religion or who have no religion whatsoever.

Herein lies a healthy secularity: to base state decisions on purely rational principles, even though they have been defended mainly or exclusively by religious groups. In controversial subjects, it is necessary to pay more attention to the type of argument employed than in the person or institution that presents it. To dismiss a statement of a scientific or philosophical nature as a "religious argument," merely because it came out of the mouth of a religious leader, is to distort the spirit of secularism, to turn it into a secularism that attempts to completely erase the religious phenomenon from the public sphere by confining it or, at most, to the strictly private sphere.